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“The American Constitution . . . is founded on a creed. America is the
only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth
with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of
Independence; perhaps the only piece of practical politics that is also
theoretical politics and also great literature.”
— G. K. Chesterton, What I Saw in America (1922)
About twenty years ago, when I was a young graduate student like many of the
students in this room, I took a wonderful seminar at the University of Virginia about
constitutional interpretation taught by Henry Abraham, the first recipient of the
lifetime achievement award from the Law and Courts section of the American
Political Science Association.1 In the seminar we read many of the classic works in
constitutional interpretation, such as John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust,
Robert Bork’s The Tempting of America, and Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire,
among others.2 I enjoyed the reading, but I quickly came to realize that the theory of
constitutional interpretation articulated in a particular book or article always seemed
to lead to the political results favored by the author of the book or article. Bork’s
*

Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law. This article was
prepared for an April 18, 2014, symposium about “History and the Meaning of the
Constitution” at Cleveland State University Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The
differences between the written version and the oral version are the addition of footnotes to
the former and the condensed format of the latter. I thank Stan Gerber and Peter Martin
Jaworski for reading a draft of the article and Brown University’s Political Theory Project for
hosting me while I wrote it.
1
See Law and Courts Section Award Recipients, http://www.apsanet.org/sections/
sectionAwardDetail.cfm?section=Sec02 (last visited June 9, 2014).
2

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).

1

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

1

2

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

theory, for example, determined that Roe v. Wade was incorrect; whereas Dworkin’s
led to a generous use of racial preferences in higher education admissions decisions.
Succinctly stated, I concluded that all of the theories of constitutional interpretation
appealed, at their essential level, to political values. In the apt words of Felix
Frankfurter, constitutional interpretation “is not at all a science, but applied
politics.”3
What I set out to do in my seminar paper for Professor Abraham’s class was
identify the appropriate political philosophy through which the Constitution should
be interpreted.4 I quickly expanded my seminar paper into my Ph.D. dissertation,
which I completed in 1992,5 and my revised Ph.D. dissertation became my first
book, To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional
Interpretation, which was published in 1995.6 I have spent the last decade or so
writing about colonial American legal history rather than constitutional
interpretation,7 but given the topic of today’s symposium—“History and the
Meaning of the Constitution”—I would now like to discuss the theory of
constitutional interpretation that I first developed as a graduate student two decades
ago. It is a theory that also led me to publish the first book about Clarence Thomas’s
jurisprudence—First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas8—and it is
a theory about which other scholars have written over the years, including two of the
other participants at this symposium. I call the theory “liberal originalism.”9 I even
had the privilege in March of 2013 at Ohio Northern University to debate the theory
with Pulitzer Prize winning historian Gordon Wood.10
3
Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL
PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938 at 3, 6 (1939).
4

The seminar paper became my first publication. See Scott D. Gerber, Original Intent
and Its Obligations: Rediscovering the Principles of the American Founding, 11 HAM. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1 (1990).
5
See Scott Douglas Gerber, “To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence
and Constitutional Interpretation” (Ph.D. dissertation, Politics, University of Virginia, 1992).
6

See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995).

OF

7

See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606-1787 (2011); Scott D. Gerber, Bringing Ideas Back In: A Brief
Historiography of American Colonial Law, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 359 (2011); Scott D.
Gerber, Law and the Lively Experiment in Colonial Rhode Island, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD.
453 (2013).
8
See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE
THOMAS (expanded ed. 2002).

OF

CLARENCE

9

I coined the phrase two decades before it became associated with the work of Jack
Balkin. Moreover, my approach to constitutional theory is much different than that of Balkin:
my liberal originalism is libertarian; Balkin’s theory is egalitarian. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf,
The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2044-45 (2012) (reviewing JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
(2011)).
10

See Gordon S. Wood & Scott D. Gerber, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 39
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435 (2013) (transcript of the debate). I also spoke about liberal originalism on
June 2, 2014, at a conference at Brown University about freedom of expression and the living
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I. LIBERAL ORIGINALISM
“Originalism” is a theory of constitutional interpretation that came to prominence
during the Reagan Administration as an alternative to the so-called notion of a living
constitution embraced by progressive judges and law professors. Robert Bork wrote
an influential article about it in the early 1970s,11 but it was Attorney General Edwin
Meese who brought originalism to public consciousness through a series of speeches
in the mid-1980s.12 The Federalist Society, which was founded in the 1980s and
which is co-sponsoring today’s symposium, is likewise strongly committed to
originalism as the proper method for interpreting the Constitution.13
Shortly thereafter, the law reviews exploded with an avalanche of articles both
criticizing and defending originalism, and the commentary on the subject has
continued unabated ever since.14 Books and articles about the history of originalism
have been published,15 and the debate over originalism has now shifted from what
Meese famously called “a jurisprudence of original intention”16 to a self-styled “new
originalism” that searches—sometimes via highly technical discussions of the
philosophy of language17—for the original public meaning of the Constitution’s
text.18
In my work I have labeled the dominant iterations of originalism “conservative
originalism.” It is an approach that dictates that judges may legitimately recognize
only those rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution, or ascertainably implicit
in its structure or history. In all other cases, conservative originalists argue, the
majority is entitled to govern—to make moral choices—through the political

constitution hosted jointly by Brown and Northwestern University School of Law. See
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Theory_Project/event/freedom-expression-livingconstitution-conference (last visited June 11, 2014).
11
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L. J. 1 (1971).
12
See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Address before the American Bar Association, in THE GREAT
DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1 (1986).
13

See, e.g., ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY
2007).

OF

DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed.,

14
See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013); Peter Martin
Jaworski, Originalism All the Way Down: Or, the Explosion of Progressivism, 27 CAN. J. L. &
JURISP. 313 (2013).
15

See, e.g., JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005).

IN

AMERICAN LAW

AND

POLITICS: A

16
Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 5 (1988), reprinted in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
BEHAVIOR 584 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat ed., 2d. ed., 1989).
17

See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, “Semantic Originalism,” Illinois Public Law and Legal
Theory Research Papers Series No. 07-24, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 (last visited June 11, 2014).
18

See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 14, at ch. 2 (providing a concise history of the meaning of
originalism).
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process.19 “Liberal originalism,” by contrast, maintains that the Constitution should
be interpreted in light of the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence.
Liberal originalism rejects both conservative originalism and the notion of a living
constitution on the ground that they are merely post-hoc rationalizations for preconceived political results. The conservatives’ initial call for a jurisprudence of
original intention was a response to the liberal jurisprudence of the Warren and early
Burger Courts, whereas the progressives’ notion of a living constitution was a
reaction to conservative originalism. The “new” conservative originalists endeavor
to guide the decisions of the conservative Rehnquist and Roberts Courts,20 while
many on the Left—“judicial minimalists” and “popular constitutionalists”—are
presently trying to limit or eliminate judicial review itself so that the nowconservative federal judiciary cannot rollback existing precedents involving hot
button social issues such as affirmative action and abortion. These newer theories,
like the older ones, are too often merely partisan arguments masquerading as
constitutional theory.21
Liberal originalism insists that conservative originalists mischaracterize the
Constitution as establishing a majority-rule democracy, a mischaracterization that is
also made by many constitutional theorists of progressive political views. Because of
the Framers’ desire to avoid what Elbridge Gerry called the “excess of democracy,”22
they created a republican form of government, not a majority-rule democracy. And
in that republican form of government, the Court is to play a central role: chief
guardian of the natural rights of the American people, especially of individuals and
minorities. Briefly put, I employ a conservative methodology, but arrive at liberal
results, as “liberal” is understood in the classic sense of seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury Lockean political philosophy.
Part I of To Secure These Rights documents how the United States of America
was founded to secure the natural rights of the American people.23 “To secure these
rights,” Thomas Jefferson proclaims in the Declaration of Independence, is the
19

With the notable exception of Randy Barnett, the vast majority of “new originalists”
share the Bork/Meese preference for deferring as much as possible to the political process.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism:
A Reply to Professor Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005). See generally Randy E.
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7
(2006); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
20

See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599
(2004).
21

See, e.g., Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1067 (2008). See also Scott D. Gerber, Book Review, 92 J. AM. HIST. 1532
(2006) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); Scott D. Gerber, The Judicial Brezhnev
Doctrine, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 309 (2000) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) and MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)).
22
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 48 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(remarks of Elbridge Gerry). See generally GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY:
FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN (1976).
23

See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6, at pt. I.
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reason that “governments are instituted among men.”24 To secure natural rights is,
therefore, why the Constitution was enacted, and to secure natural rights is how the
Constitution should be interpreted. That is the “original intent” of the Founders.
Here, it is necessary to explain the connection between the Founders’
background attitudes on the purpose of government and the interpretation of the
particular provisions of the Constitution. The most important point to recognize is
that, as just mentioned, the Constitution was written for a reason: to establish a form
of government that would provide better security for natural rights than was
provided under the Articles of Confederation. To make the point somewhat
differently, the particular provisions of the Constitution were written with the
Founders’ background attitudes in mind. The Constitution is not an end in itself; it is
the means by which the American political community’s ideals—its ends—are
ordered. It is therefore necessary to interpret the Constitution in light of those ideals;
ideals expressed with unparalleled eloquence by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration
of Independence.
The necessity of keeping the Founders’ background attitudes in mind when
interpreting the particular provisions of the Constitution becomes even more
apparent when one realizes that many of the most significant provisions of the
Constitution are phrased in general terms, especially those concerning individual
rights. For example, the First Amendment’s directive that Congress shall make no
law “abridging the freedom of speech” is not unambiguous, nor is the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.” Moving beyond
the original ten amendments, what does it mean to say, as the Fourteenth
Amendment does, that no state shall deny to any person “the equal protection of the
laws”? Provisions as general as these—and there are many others in the
Constitution—are not self-interpreting. They can be given meaning and life only
when they are construed in light of the moral and political principles upon which
they are based. As political scientist David O’Brien aptly observed long ago,
“Interpreting the Constitution … presupposes a judicial and political philosophy and
poses inescapable questions of substantive value choices.”25 Although I reject the
argument advanced by many proponents of the application of literary analysis to
legal texts—that meaning cannot be extracted from legal texts but can only be put
into them; that, in other words, the Constitution means nothing and means
anything—it is difficult to deny the more modest claim that “texts can be interpreted
only in some ‘context.’”26 And that “context,” as To Secure These Rights describes,
is the Lockean political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence.
Of course, it is possible to construe the provisions of the Constitution in light of
philosophical principles other than those embodied in the Declaration. One need
only peruse the plethora of provocative theories of constitutional interpretation
advanced over the years to appreciate this fact. However, those advancing nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional interpretation have failed to show that the
particular approach they favor is based on anything other than their own moral and
political preferences. Indeed, the late Ronald Dworkin, a forceful critic of
24

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

25

1 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 89 (1991).

26

Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux, Preface to INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE:
A HERMENEUTIC READER xi, xii (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

5

6

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

originalism, maintained that we should abandon the search—hopeless, in his view—
for the Framers’ intent in favor of the “best argument” about political morality.27
The problem with Dworkin’s interpretive position, and a problem repeated by
most lawyers attempting to articulate theories of constitutional interpretation—
including, with all due respect, Jack Balkin, who now claims to be an originalist28—
is that under his theory substantive values are inevitably established by those with
the best argumentation skills—by clever lawyers such as Dworkin himself. If the
rule of law means anything, it surely means that the Constitution should not be
interpreted in such a subjective fashion, especially by unelected and life-tenured
judges. Moreover, if the American people do wish to depart from the natural rights
principles of the Declaration of Independence and adopt, for instance, the
progressive agenda preferred by most American law professors or the
majoritarianism of the vast majority of conservative originalists, they should employ
the Article V amendment process and so specify. To date, this has not occurred—and
it is not likely to occur.
II. THE REACTION TO LIBERAL ORIGINALISM
Space constraints permit me to discuss only a couple of the reactions to liberal
originalism. A number of scholars have praised it,29 and at least one has embraced it
as his own.30 I will not discuss that reaction here, other than to say that it was nice to
27

RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION:
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 145 (1993).
28

AN ARGUMENT

ABOUT

ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,

See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).

29

To Secure These Rights was reviewed in a lot of different outlets, including the
American Historical Review, American Journal of Legal History, American Political Science
Review, Choice, Constitutional Commentary, FreedomAndCapitalism.com, Harvard Law
Review, Journal of Law and Politics, Journal of the Early Republic, Journal of Politics,
Laissez Faire, Law and History Review, Law and Politics Book Review, Legal Studies Forum,
Political Science Quarterly, Second Renaissance Books, and Yale Law Journal.
30
See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 489 (2004) (reviewing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND
IMPACT (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002)). Sandefur’s citations to authority are sometimes
misleading as to who coined the phrase “liberal originalism” (I did). I brought my concern to
his attention, he sort of apologized for it, and he has since apparently stopped citing my work
altogether when discussing the Declaration of Independence in constitutional interpretation.
See Emails from Scott Gerber to Timothy M. Sandefur, May 8 and May 10, 2010, and Email
from Timothy M. Sandefur to Scott Gerber, May 9, 2010 (on file with Gerber). See generally
TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014) (failing to cite either To Secure These
Rights or First Principles). Sandefur had invited me in 2007 to present a talk about “The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation” to the Sacramento, California
lawyers’ chapter of the Federalist Society. Fortunately for me, at least some other scholars
realize that Sandefur’s work borrows heavily from mine. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter
J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 260 n.104 (2009) (pointing out that
Sandefur’s theory of constitutional interpretation “that relies on the Declaration of
Independence as part of the nation’s organic law” is “based in substantial part on the work of
Scott Gerber”). It is, of course, problematic when others do not realize it. See, e.g., Ethan J.
Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 354 n.5
(2007) (“Although I can’t spell out the differences in this context, what I’m calling ‘lefty’
originalism is rather different from what Timothy Sandefur has recently called ‘liberal
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read. Instead, I will concentrate on the criticisms of two of the other participants at
this symposium, Patrick Charles and Lee Strang. I then will discuss Justice Clarence
Thomas’s use of liberal originalism and the reactions to his use of it.
A. Patrick Charles on Liberal Originalism
Historian Patrick Charles discussed my work on liberal originalism in a 2011
article in the William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal entitled “Restoring ‘Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness’ in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An
Exercise in Legal History.”31 He disagrees with my work. For example, he writes:
As a matter of eighteenth-century constitutional thought, Gerber’s claims
falter, like [Randy] Barnett’s, in that they misconstrue the concepts of the
public or common good and the true importance of virtue in republican
constitutionalism. Perhaps Gerber’s greatest shortfall is his mischaracterization of the “first principle” of government. Gerber reads it as
embodying “the institutional means to secure the natural-rights
philosophical ends [in] the Declaration.” However, as will be shown
below, this ignores that the first principle of government is the consent of
the governed, or what the founding generation referred to as the good of
the whole.32
The above quotation makes clear that Charles disagrees with liberal originalism
because he is a utilitarian, not a libertarian. As he concisely put it in a ConSource
Blog post summarizing his 2011 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal article,
“American independence and the Declaration [of Independence] rested on one
simple governmental principle—the greatest happiness of the greatest number
through an equal government.”33 Unfortunately for Charles, as I describe at length in
To Secure These Rights, the political theorist who most influenced America’s
founders was John Locke,34 the father of libertarian political philosophy, not Jeremy
Bentham, the leading utilitarian of his day.35 In short, Charles fails to understand why
the United States of America is a nation: its origins, purposes, and ideals. To invoke
the “celebrated” Montesquieu,36 America’s “animating principle”37 is liberty, not
originalism.’ See Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for Our Future, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2004).”).
31

See Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457
(2011).
32

Id. at 480.

33

Patrick J. Charles, Placing the Declaration of Independence in Historical Context: Thoughts
on Educating Current and Future Generations about America’s Founding Document,
http://blog.consource.org/post/27415739804/placing-the-declaration-of-independence-in-historical
(last visited June 13, 2014).
34

See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6, at pt. I.

35

Bentham famously referred to the American idea that there were natural rights as
“nonsense upon stilts.” Human Rights, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/275840/
human-rights/219322/Nonsense-upon-stilts-the-critics-of-natural-rights (quoting Bentham).
36

THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 302 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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utility. After all, utilitarians are willing to sacrifice private rights for the greater
public good. The Founders of the United States decreed precisely the opposite.
B. Lee Strang on Liberal Originalism
Lee Strang has discussed my work in a number of places. I will focus on his
article “Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A
Constitutional Right to Life,”38 an article that borrows from a much longer article
about the Declaration of Independence that he published previously.39 Strang kindly
refers to me as “the best exponent of the Declarationist view.”40 He also kindly states
that “[l]ikely the strongest scholarly work on the interpretive impact of the
Declaration on constitutional interpretation was written by Professor Scott Gerber,
To Secure These Rights”41 and that “Professor Gerber has put forth what is likely the
strongest scholarly argument that the original meaning of the Constitution (or at least
some of its provisions) incorporated the Declaration.”42
Of course, Strang says all of these wonderful things only to conclude that I am
wrong. He writes:
Gerber fails to tie the general belief in natural rights during the founding
and ratification period to the Constitution except in the most general way
and therefore fails to support his specific contention that the Declaration
should play an explicit, privileged role in constitutional interpretation.
Further, even if one accepted Gerber’s argument that the Constitution was
originally understood as the means to effectuate protection of the rights
listed in the rights phrase, it does not necessarily follow—and Gerber fails
to show that it did follow historically—that the meaning of the text of the
Constitution is something other than its original meaning, a meaning
somehow closer to the Declaration.43
With all due respect to the talented Professor Strang, he does not understand how
I view the Declaration’s interpretive function. In a new book entitled Universal
Rights and the Constitution, Stephen Simon does understand it. Here is what Simon
says:

37

M. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748) 21, 30 (Anne M. Cohler et al. ed.
& trans., 1989).
38

See Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution:
A Constitutional Right to Life, in LIFE & LEARNING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH
UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE AT VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, 2006 at 43 (Joseph
W. Koterski ed., 2007), available at http://www.uffl.org/vol16/strang06.pdf.
39
See generally Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the
Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 413
(2006).
40

Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A
Constitutional Right to Life, supra note 38, at 47.
41

Id. at 48.

42

Id. at 54.

43

Id. at 54-55.
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[Gerber] stresses that the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions only
can be understood properly when recognized as driven by the “naturalrights political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence” and the
American Revolution. Gerber looks to the meaning that the words had for
those who gave them legal force while emphasizing that this meaning
must be understood within its intellectual context. Although Gerber would
construe the principles embedded in the Constitution at a higher level of
generality than would many exclusivists, he nevertheless views
constitutional understandings as fixed to the document’s original
meaning. The appropriate vehicle of constitutional change is Article V,
and the original meaning cannot be “trumped by evolving precedent,
values, or needs.” When Gerber speaks of natural rights, he is referring to
the beliefs of those who produced the Constitution, beliefs with specific,
substantive content. His method of interpretation does not invite judges to
rely on any universal arguments they might happen to consider sound.
The Framers’ natural law approach allows judges to rely only on natural
law ideas with the appropriate historical pedigree. An approach like
Gerber’s is understood best as an exclusivist position instilled with proper
appreciation for the character of the beliefs that informed the
Constitution’s enactment.44
In short, Professor Simon, who is himself a political theorist, understands that my
approach to constitutional interpretation is grounded in political theory, rather than
history. Admittedly, mine is a theory that identifies the relevant political theory by
appealing to history, but I do not use history in the same narrow sense that a
conservative originalist such as Professor Strang would prefer. As I mentioned
during a public debate with historian Gordon Wood about “The Supreme Court and
the Uses of History”: “My answer to the question whether Supreme Court justices
should use history to decide cases is a qualified yes. This is what I mean by that:
they should use history to identify the political philosophy of the American
Founding and then decide cases in light of that political philosophy.”45
Strang’s discussion of slavery likewise reveals that, as a conservative originalist,
he does not understand liberal originalism. He writes:
The Constitution’s accommodation of slavery and the denial of equality
that it entailed makes it very difficult—if not impossible—to coherently
interpret the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration. Even were
one to assume that one could interpret the Constitution in light of the
Declaration, one would still have to explain how the practice of slavery
with its gross denial of equality existed—indeed, flourished—under the
Constitution, a practice that was not ended except through the Civil War.46
Abraham Lincoln, the person most responsible for ending slavery, by contrast,
understood liberal originalism. Indeed, as I describe in To Secure These Rights, like
44

STEPHEN A. SIMON, UNIVERSAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 87-88 (2014).

45

Wood & Gerber, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, supra note 10, at 437
(remarks of Gerber).
46

Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A
Constitutional Right to Life, supra note 38, at 56.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

9

10

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

Thomas Jefferson before him, and Martin Luther King Jr. and Clarence Thomas after
him, Lincoln embraced liberal originalism.47 Lincoln proclaimed as follows in his
famous speech criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the infamous case
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857):
Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, admits that the
language of the Declaration is broad enough to include the whole of the
human family, but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that
instrument did not intend to include negroes, by the fact that they did not
at once, actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now this
grave argument comes to just nothing at all, by the other fact, that they
did not at once, or ever afterwards, actually place all white people on an
equality with one another . . . . They did not mean to assert the obvious
untruth, that all men were then actually enjoying equality, nor yet, that
they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no
power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so
that the enforcement of it might follow as circumstances should
permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which
could be familiar to all, and revered by all, constantly looked to,
constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained,
constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening
its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people
of all colors everywhere.48
As Lincoln’s remarks intimate, omitting Jefferson’s objection to slavery in the
Declaration of Independence—Jefferson wanted to condemn it49—and including
guarantees to slavery in the original Constitution were unfortunate political
compromises that had to be made if the United States of America was to come into
being in 1776 and create a strong central government in 1787—both of which were
necessary if slavery was one day to be abolished. The necessity of political
compromise aside, the inhumane treatment of slaves and the long and bloody Civil
War that resulted from slavery are indelible proof of the pain that departing from the
Declaration’s natural-rights principles has engendered in the United States.
Revealingly, what unites Strang and Charles in their opposition to liberal
originalism is a shared distrust of a vigorous role for the judiciary in American
constitutionalism. Charles is a traditional majoritarian, albeit a thoughtful one, who
wishes to defer as much as possible to the electoral process, even at the expense of
private rights. Strang is one of the most prolific of the “new” originalists and he
wants judges to enforce the determinate original meaning of the Constitution’s text.
In what he terms the “construction zone”—in other words, when the original public

47

See also Scott D. Gerber, Justice Thomas and Mr. Jefferson, LEGAL TIMES, May 5,
2003, at 60-61.
48

Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision, June 26, 1857, reprinted in 1
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 398 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (emphasis
supplied in bold face).
49

See, e.g., Gerard W. Gawalt, Drafting the Declaration, in THE DECLARATION
INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT ch. 1 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002).
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meaning is under-determined—he insists that judges should defer to contrary
constructions by elected officials.
As I explain in Part II of To Secure These Rights,50 and as I detail at great length
in my recent Oxford University Press book about the origins of judicial
independence in America,51 the judiciary needs to play a vigorous role in American
life in order to check and balance the elected legislature and executive so as to
ensure the people’s personal freedoms. Summarily stated, neither Charles nor Strang
appreciates that in the political theory of American constitutional government there
is what John Adams referred to as “a distinct judicial power” whose principal charge
is to protect individual rights from overreaching by the elected branches of the
government.52 In fact, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 written by Adams, and
which served as one of the prototypes of the U.S. Constitution, listed a strong and
independent judiciary as a fundamental right of the people:
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life,
liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of
the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be
tried by judges as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity
will admit. It is, therefore, not only the best policy, but for the security of
the rights of the people, and of every citizen, that the judges of the
supreme judicial court should hold their offices as long as they behave
themselves well, and that they should have honorable salaries ascertained
and established by standing laws.53
III. JUSTICE THOMAS’S LIBERAL ORIGINALISM
I was writing my Ph.D. dissertation about the relationship between the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States when
Clarence Thomas was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court. The media was
reporting at the time that Thomas was likewise interested in that relationship. I do
not recall whether it was my idea or somebody else’s, but given who Thomas was—
a judge on the second most significant court in the United States—and who he was
likely to become—a justice on the most powerful court in the world—I put aside my
dissertation for a couple of weeks and wrote an article to assess the degree to which
the views on constitutional interpretation espoused in Thomas’s speeches and
writings, and in his decisions on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
manifested the Lockean liberal commitment to individual rights that I believed the
Declaration demanded.54 About five years later, after To Secure These Rights had
50

See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6, at pt. II.

51

See GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 7.

52

See GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 7. See also Scott D. Gerber, The
Political Theory of an Independent Judiciary, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 223 (2007),
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/gerber.html (last visited June 14, 2014).
53

MASS. CONST. art. XXIX (1780).

54

See Scott D. Gerber, Introductory Address: Justice for Clarence Thomas: An
Intellectual History of Justice Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Supreme Court, 88 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 667, 667-68 (2011). See generally Scott D. Gerber, The Jurisprudence of
Clarence Thomas, 8 J. L. & POL. 107 (1991).
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been published and reviewed, my editor encouraged me to write what became the
first book-length exegesis on Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence, First Principles: The
Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas.55
One of my conclusions in First Principles was that Justice Thomas is a liberal
originalist in civil rights cases and a conservative originalist in other areas of
constitutional law.56 As I have pointed out elsewhere, Thomas’s liberal originalism
traces to Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King Jr., and it is
an originalism that places the Declaration of Independence at the heart of the
American conception of civil rights.57
When Jefferson wrote the Declaration during the summer of 1776, he was
inspired by the prevailing individual rights political theory of the day (most notably,
the political theory of seventeenth-century British theorist John Locke). When
Lincoln condemned slavery in the 1850s and 1860s, he was doing so on individual
rights grounds (slaves were people, Lincoln insisted, who were entitled to enjoy the
rights of individuals—especially the right to be free). And when King delivered his
famous “I Have a Dream” speech in 1963, his “dream” was that his children would
one day live in a nation “where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but
by the content of their character.”58 Clarence Thomas shares this vision of the
American regime. He has for most of his public life.
For example, Thomas wrote in a 1987 article in the Howard Law Journal that the
“founding principles of equality and liberty” set forth in the Declaration of
Independence “dictate the policy of action towards Black Americans.”59 Thomas,
then-chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
credited the first Justice John Marshall Harlan with being the initial member of the
Supreme Court to appreciate the connection between the Declaration and the
enforcement of the nation’s civil rights laws. In particular, Thomas applauded
Harlan’s solitary dissent in the infamous 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the case in
which the Court constitutionalized the practice of racial segregation. It was in that
stinging dissent that Harlan coined the phrase that would later become so closely
associated with Thomas himself: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”60
Similarly, in a 1985 article in the Stetson Law Review, Thomas discussed his
daily responsibilities of enforcing the nation’s civil rights laws as chairman of the
EEOC. His rejection of the agency’s group-based emphasis was clear. He wrote:
I intend to take EEO enforcement back to where it started by defending
the rights of individuals who are hurt by discriminatory practices. To do
55

See GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 8.

56

See id.

57

See, e.g., Gerber, Justice Thomas and Mr. Jefferson, supra note 47. The analysis that
follows in this section borrows from several of my earlier works. See, e.g., id.
58

Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream, Address Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in Gerber, ed., THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 49, at 317, 319.
59

Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 984 (1987).
60

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/5

12

2014]

LIBERAL ORIGINALISM

13

this, we intend to pursue individual cases as well as pattern and practice
cases . . . . Those who insist on arguing that the principle of equal
opportunity, the cornerstone of civil rights, means preferences for certain
groups have relinquished their roles as moral and ethical leaders in this
area. I bristle at the thought, for example, that it is morally proper to
protest against minority racial preferences in South Africa while arguing
for such preferences here.61
Thomas’s critics strived during his 1991 Supreme Court confirmation process to
mischaracterize his views about the Declaration of Independence. For example,
Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe wrote in a scathing New York Times
op-ed that Thomas would use the Declaration to turn back the clock to the darkest
days of the nation’s history:
Most conservatives criticize the judiciary for expanding its powers,
“creating” rights rather than “interpreting” the Constitution . . . . Clarence
Thomas, judging from his speeches and scholarly writings, seems instead
to believe judges should enforce the Founders’ natural law philosophy—
the inalienable rights “given man by his Creator”—which he maintains is
revealed most completely in the Declaration of Independence. He is the
first Supreme Court nominee in 50 years to maintain that natural law
should be readily consulted in constitutional interpretation.62
What critics such as Tribe failed to mention was that Thomas was articulating the
standard individual rights interpretation of the Declaration: the same interpretation
shared by Jefferson, Lincoln, and King. Indeed, Thomas made this point repeatedly
during his confirmation battle. For instance, when asked by then-Senator Howard
Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, arguably his most unwavering opponent on the Judiciary
Committee, about a speech he had previously given, Thomas responded:
[T]he point I think throughout these speeches is a notion that we should
be careful about the relationship between the government and the
individual and should be careful that the government itself does not at
some point displace or infringe on the rights of the individual. That is a
concern, as I have noted here, that runs throughout my speeches.63
Justice Thomas has continued to speak publicly about the Declaration of
Independence since being confirmed to the Supreme Court. He reminded the faculty
and students of James Madison University that Madison, the chief architect of the
Constitution, built the Constitution on “universal principles, [which] we find . . .
most succinctly and, indeed, elegantly stated by Madison’s close friend, Thomas

61
Clarence Thomas, The Equal Opportunity Commission: Reflections on a New
Philosophy, 15 STETSON L. REV. 29, 35 (1985). Of course, apartheid is no longer the law in
South Africa.
62

Laurence H. Tribe, “Natural Law” and the Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at

A15.
63
The Thomas Hearings, 102d Cong. (1991) (statement of Clarence Thomas, then-United
States Supreme Court Justice nominee, to the Senate Judiciary Committee), available at
http://www.people.virginia.edu/-govdoe/thomas/hearings.html.
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Jefferson, in our Declaration of Independence.”64 Thomas went on in his speech to
describe how the Constitution secures the rights promised to all Americans by the
Declaration. Thomas’s critics would be well served by reading this speech.
His critics also should read his February 9, 1999, Lincoln Day address to the
Claremont Institute. There, Justice Thomas urges the American people “to be ever
vigilant in reminding us—me and everyone else who has the privilege of serving our
nation through public office—of the principles of our founding and how they apply
to the controversies of our time.”65 That speech, in my judgment, is the most
significant speech about the Declaration of Independence since Reverend King’s “I
Have a Dream.”
Thomas is, of course, not alone in his commitment to the Declaration of
Independence. However, what makes Thomas the most important voice today on the
Declaration is the official position he occupies in the American regime: one of nine
members of the nation’s highest court. Thomas, in short, has the power to do
something about effectuating the individual rights principles of the Declaration. His
civil rights opinions and votes demonstrate that he has been more than willing to act
on them during his tenure on the Court.
In 1995's Missouri v. Jenkins, for example, Thomas became the first Supreme
Court justice to directly criticize Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Although he
called state-mandated segregation “despicable,” he said that the Court was wrong in
1954 to rely on disputable social evidence to declare segregation unconstitutional
rather than invoking the “constitutional principle” that “the government must treat
citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic or religious groups.”66
Justice Thomas’s conception of civil rights as an individual, not a group, concern
also explains his approach to voting rights. In 1994, in Holder v. Hall, Thomas wrote
in a concurring opinion that racial groups should not “be conceived of largely as
political interest groups,” that blacks do not all think alike, and that existing case law
should be overturned to eliminate claims for “proportional allocation of political
power according to race.”67 Thomas echoed these views in several more recent
Voting Rights Act cases, including Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder (2009) and Shelby County v. Holder (2013).68 He again wrote
separately in those cases.69
With respect to racial preferences, Justice Thomas has issued four separate
opinions on the subject. In Adarand Constructors v. Peña, the 1995 government
64

Clarence Thomas, James Madison Day Lecture, Remarks Delivered at James Madison
University (March 15, 2001), available at http://www.jmu.edu/jmuweb/general/news2/general_
200132382450.shtml.
65

Clarence Thomas, The Virtue of Practical Wisdom, Remarks Delivered at the Third
Annual Claremont Institute Lincoln Day Colloquium (Feb. 9, 1999), reprinted in Gerber, ed.,
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 49, at 243, 247.
66

Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905, 912 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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See Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
69

See Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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contracting case that seemingly called the constitutionality of racial preferences into
serious question, Thomas invoked the Declaration of Independence as the rule of
decision.70 He wrote:
There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart
of this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle of inherent
equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. See Declaration of
Independence (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness.”).71
Justice Thomas again invoked the Declaration in his thirty-one-page separate
opinion in the 2003 University of Michigan affirmative action case, Grutter v.
Bollinger. After criticizing the Grutter majority for “fail[ing] to justify its decision
by reference to any principle,”72 Thomas closed his opinion by reminding his
colleagues that the controlling principle—that articulated in the Declaration—
required the case to come out the other way. He wrote:
[T]he majority has placed its imprimatur on a practice that can only
weaken the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of
Independence and the Equal Protection Clause . . . . It has been nearly 140
years since Frederick Douglass asked the intellectual ancestors of the Law
School to “[d]o nothing with us!” and the Nation adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment. Now we must wait another 25 years to see this principle of
equality vindicated. I therefore respectfully dissent.73
In 2007's Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, Justice Thomas continued with this theme:
The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a colorblind
Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today’s plurality . . . .
But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the
Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”74

70
It is possible to find racial preferences unconstitutional without invoking the Declaration of
Independence. For example, some conservative civil rights lawyers and scholars focus on the text
and history of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Originalism and Affirmative
Action, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, April 10, 2013, http://www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/345181/originalism-and-affirmative-action-roger-clegg (last visited June 16, 2014) (citing his
own work and that of Michael Rappaport).
71
Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 357 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Id. at 378.
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Most recently, in a twenty-page concurring opinion in the 2013 case of Fisher v.
University of Texas,75 Justice Thomas equated the racial classifications embraced by
the University of Texas with two of the Supreme Court’s most reviled decisions,
Korematsu v. United States (1944),76 in which the Court permitted the internment of
people with Japanese ancestry during World War II, and Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896),77 wherein the Court endorsed the “separate-but-equal” doctrine eventually
rejected unanimously in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).78 Thomas’s liberal
originalist approach to civil rights law was in full sail when the Court’s lone African
American justice reminded the state of Texas’s flagship institution of higher
education that the “Equal Protection Clause guarantees every person the right to be
treated equally by the State, without regard to race. At the heart of this [guarantee]
lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals and not as
members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.”79 And it is because the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees every American’s constitutional right to be treated as
an individual that, Justice Thomas insisted, the nation’s highest Court “must subject
all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, all racial
classifications are categorically prohibited unless they are ‘necessary to further a
compelling government interest.’”80 Unfortunately for the University of Texas,
Thomas continued,
the educational benefits flowing from student body diversity—assuming
they exist—hardly qualify as a compelling state interest. Indeed, the
argument that educational benefits justify racial discrimination was
advanced in support of racial segregation in the 1950's, but emphatically
rejected by this Court. And just as the alleged educational benefits of
segregation were insufficient to justify racial discrimination then, see
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the alleged
educational benefits of diversity cannot justify racial discrimination
today.81
IV. THE REACTION TO JUSTICE THOMAS’S LIBERAL ORIGINALISM
The Left criticizes Justice Thomas heavily for his civil rights opinions and votes.
For example, Eric Segall, a progressive constitutional law professor at Georgia State
University College of Law, accused Thomas of “hypocrisy” and “bad faith” in a
blistering article about Thomas’s affirmative action jurisprudence published shortly

75
See Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). For more on Thomas’s opinion in Fisher, see Scott D. Gerber, Clarence Thomas,
Fisher v. University of Texas, and the Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education,
MIDWEST J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming in 2014).
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See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Fisher v. University of Texas.82 To
his credit, Segall subsequently invited me to give a talk about Thomas at Georgia
State so that his colleagues could hear the other side of the story: a rare display of
commitment to intellectual diversity in a law professorate that is too often hell-bent
on suppressing conservative and libertarian perspectives.83 The gist of Segall’s
article is that, as an originalist, Thomas must support affirmative action rather than
insist it is unconstitutional. Segall concludes his article as follows:
The constitutional question raised by Fisher, and by all affirmative action
cases, is whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents governmental officials from using racial
classifications to increase diversity, redress prior discrimination, and
foster a more racially tolerant society. A Justice sincerely concerned with
the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment would have to concede
that there is little constitutional basis for foreclosing majority groups from
assisting minority groups in this manner. Justice Thomas claims to be a
Justice concerned only with text and history (not the Justices’ personal
views on difficult policy questions), yet also suggests the Constitution
absolutely prohibits all racial preferences. In light of the constitutional
text, and its history, he simply cannot have it both ways.84
As I mentioned during my talk at Georgia State, my friend Professor Segall does
not understand Justice Thomas’s originalism. He is far from alone in this regard.
Segall was writing in anticipation of Fisher in the hopes, it seems, of somehow
“shaming” Thomas into ruling for the University of Texas. Scott Lemieux was
writing after Fisher had been decided: a decision in which, as I discussed above,
Thomas not only ruled against the University of Texas but also reiterated his
longstanding belief that the Equal Protection Clause outlaws racial preferences in
higher education admissions decisions. Lemieux opined in the liberal American
Prospect magazine that “The original understanding of the 14th Amendment can be
interpreted as forbidding all state affirmative action only if the principles of equal
protection are defined at such a high level of abstraction that there’s no meaningful
distinction between ‘originalism’ and any other form of constitutional
interpretation.”85 Of course, Lemieux fails to appreciate that (1) liberal originalism is
a form of originalism that differs markedly from both conservative originalism and

82

See Eric J. Segall, Justice Thomas and Affirmative Action: Bad Faith, Confusion or Both?, 3
WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 111 (2013), available at http://wakeforestlawreview.com/justicethomas-and-affirmative-action-bad-faith-confusion-or-both (last visited June 18, 2014).
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Radicalization of American Legal Education, Revisited: Why the Right's Efforts Are Good for Law
Schools and the Law, FINDLAW.COM, March 15, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
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the notion of a living constitution86 and (2) Justice Thomas is a liberal originalist in
civil rights cases.87
Even some staunch supporters of Justice Thomas’s decisions do not understand
that Thomas is consistent within categories of constitutional law but inconsistent
across them. To mention one recent example, Ralph Rossum unsuccessfully attempts
to distinguish his book about Thomas from my book about Thomas by claiming that
all of Thomas’s constitutional decisions fit neatly under the umbrella of “original
general meaning” originalism.88 That is untrue. As I explained at length in First
Principles, Thomas approaches questions involving race differently than he does
other types of constitutional law cases, and he does so because of the profound
impact that race has had on his own life, including with respect to witnessing how
his grandfather—the man after whom Thomas titled his memoir, My Grandfather’s
Son89—was treated when Thomas was a child.90 Ralph Waldo Emerson famously
remarked that “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines.”91 Clarence Thomas has taken Emerson’s
adage to heart, which makes Thomas a wise man rather than a foolish one who needs
his jurisprudence characterized by conservative scholars as a square peg to be
pounded into a round hole.
Mark Tushnet, by contrast—almost certainly the most prolific Left-wing
constitutional law professor of the present day—understands the distinction in
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence between liberal originalism and conservative
originalism. Tushnet stated in his book about the Rehnquist Court:
The law professor Scott Gerber suggests that positions like this reflect a
division within Thomas, between what Gerber calls liberal originalism,
which tells judges to interpret the Constitution in light of the Declaration
of Independence, and conservative or Borkean originalism, which tells
them to regard the compromises embedded in the Constitution as
86

See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6.
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See GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 8.
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See RALPH A. ROSSUM, UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
RESTORATION vii (2013). Rossum argues that “original general meaning” originalism
endeavors to ascertain the meaning of the particular constitutional text in question at the time
of its adoption. Lee Strang has correctly pointed out that that is “true of all conceptions of
originalism because of originalism’s fixation thesis.” Lee J. Strang, The Jurisprudence of
Constitutional Restoration Is Originalism, but Not All Conceptions of Originalism,
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/the-jurisprudence-of-constitutional-restoration-isoriginalism-but-not-all-conceptions-of-originalism/ (last visited June 19, 2014). Rossum
commends my book about Justice Thomas in a couple of places, but he is strangely silent
about it when he is discussing Thomas’s use of the Declaration of Independence in
constitutional interpretation. See ROSSUM, supra, at ch. 6. See also Strang, The Jurisprudence
of Constitutional Restoration Is Originalism, but Not All Conceptions of Originalism, supra.
89

CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007).

90

See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Thomas and the Burning Cross, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER ONLINE (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justice-thomas-and-theburning-cross; see generally GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 8.
91

Ralph
Waldo
Emerson,
Self-Reliance
(1841),
available
http://www.emersoncentral.com/selfreliance.htm (last visited June 19, 2014).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/5

at

18

2014]

LIBERAL ORIGINALISM

19

expressing the framers’ underlying principles . . . . There’s surely
something to Gerber’s position.92
The student editors of the Harvard Law Review likewise understood the
difference between Justice Thomas’s liberal originalism in civil rights cases and his
conservative originalism in other categories of constitutional law, although they were
not as polite about it as Tushnet was. They wrote in a Book Note entitled Justice
Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism assessing Thomas’s memoir:
Professor Scott Gerber has aptly observed a dichotomy in Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence. He notes that Justice Thomas takes a “liberal
originalist” approach to civil rights issues, particularly affirmative action,
and a “conservative originalist” approach to civil liberties issues, such as
abortion . . . . Justice Thomas’s failure to address the tensions in his
judicial philosophy directly in My Grandfather’s Son leaves one to
conclude that his divergent approaches to constitutional questions are
built on the Justice’s personal policy preferences.93
The Critical Race Theorist andré douglas pond cummings—his capitalization
style, not mine—also understood the distinction in Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence
between liberal originalism and conservative originalism.94 cummings was even
more critical of it than the editors of the Harvard Law Review were. cummings was
writing in response to Thomas’s “startling dissenting opinion” in Grutter v.
Bollinger, in which Thomas maintained, as he later did in Fisher v. University of
Texas, that the admissions program at the University of Michigan Law School was
unconstitutional because it was not color-blind.95 cummings wrote:
Thomas’s adoption of “liberal originalism” may appear innocuous at first
blush. Indeed, his mantra that the Constitution be interpreted in a “color
blind” fashion, and that the Constitution protects every individual’s rights
equally, regardless of skin color, appears laudable, even impressive.
92
MARK V. TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96 (2005). See also Mark Tushnet, Understanding the Rehnquist Court,
31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (2005).
93

Book Note, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 143435 (reviewing CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007)). Several
other scholars likewise understand the difference between Justice Thomas’s liberal
originalism and his conservative originalism. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Clarence Thomas’s
Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 535, 536 (2009) (reviewing HENRY
MARK HOLZER, THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS OF CLARENCE THOMAS, 1991-2006: A
CONSERVATIVE'S PERSPECTIVE (2007)) (Thomas’s “jurisprudence is probably best described in
Scott Douglas Gerber’s term, as ‘liberal originalism’: a version of originalism closer to the
Jeffersonian principles of individual liberty articulated in the Declaration of Independence
than the ‘conservative originalism’ associated with Robert Bork and others who deprecate
Jeffersonian principles and cling to the ‘civic republicanism’ interpretation of the American
Revolution.”).
94
See andré douglas pond cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas, Affirmative
Action and the Treachery of Originalism: “The Sun Don’t Shine Here in This Part of Town,”
21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 14 (2005).
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Id. at 1.
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However, watching Thomas apply these impressive ideals to real life
cases shows clearly the havoc that such application wreaks on
constitutional issues of race[.] . . . Thomas’s fixation on individual rights
versus group concern has the group most impacted (and injured) by his
decisions and votes screaming: What is to be done about 225 years of
racism, oppression, and continued racial discord and discrimination?
What efforts are being made to level the playing field, so that the
protection of individual rights is truly meaningful? What attempts are
being made to repair or devise reparations for state and government
sponsored discrimination and racism? What efforts are being made toward
repairing broken inner cities? How does a nation repair and ameliorate,
without considering groups and the injustice visited upon an entire race?96
cummings’s passion is certainly admirable. Unfortunately, he completely
overlooked a fundamental point: Clarence Thomas is a judge, not a legislator. It is
Justice Thomas’s job to interpret the Constitution, not to rewrite it. Although it has
not won me many friends in the law professorate,97 my research has convinced me
that Thomas is correct to view the Constitution as requiring color-blindness in civil
rights cases.98 As I described above, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and
Martin Luther King Jr. would agree.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL ORIGINALISM
It is a bit awkward to write an article about constitutional interpretation that
frequently reads, at least to me, like Walt Whitman’s Song of Myself sans the lyrical
genius.99 But the future of liberal originalism is too important to do anything except
address the subject head on. In fact, in another symposium in which I had the
pleasure of participating with Lee Strang—a retrospective on Clarence Thomas’s
twenty years on the Supreme Court100—the subtitle to Strang’s article was “Justice
Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism” and he concluded “that, of
the two, Justice Scalia has, as a practical matter, done more to move American legal
practice toward originalism than Justice Thomas.”101 (Justice Scalia is a conservative
originalist.) Moreover, in a recent book entitled The Failed Promise of Originalism,
Frank Cross is likewise skeptical about the “promise” of liberal originalism. I will
conclude this article about liberal originalism with a few thoughts about Cross’s
critique of it.
96

Id. at 18-19 (citing First Principles).
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See Gerber, Introductory Address, supra note 54, at 689-90.
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See, e.g., GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at ch. 3. Thomas also believes that
color-blindness is the best policy. Id. at ch. 2.
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See Walt Whitman, Song of Myself (1892), available at
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/174745 (last visited June 18, 2014).
100

See Symposium, Celebrating an Anniversary: A Twenty-Year Review of Justice
Clarence Thomas’ Jurisprudence and Contributions as an Associate Justice on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 663, 666 (2011).
101
Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist? Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the
Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 882 (2011) (citing both First
Principles and To Secure These Rights).
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Cross discusses liberal originalism in a chapter about the sources that originalists
consult.102 After expressing concern about the unreliability of The Federalist, the
ratification records, Founding-era dictionaries, and the records of the constitutional
convention, he turns to the Declaration of Independence. He cites my work for the
claim that some scholars insist that the Declaration is at the “heart of the
Constitution,”103 and he concedes that the Declaration was a “corporate statement,
not the opinions of one or a few individuals.”104 He nevertheless suggests that its
meaning is too indeterminate to serve as a viable constraint on judicial decisionmaking. Cross writes:
When originalism was gaining credence as a theory, Raoul Berger argued
that it was the antidote to living constitutionalists trying to fulfill their
“libertarian hopes” (Berger 1977). Yet, to some leading modern-day
originalists, the theory is central to the fulfillment of their own
“libertarian hopes.” These modern-day libertarian originalists rely in part
on the natural rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence, with
the Ninth Amendment as central evidence of this philosophy. Thus,
originalism has been conceived as both strongly antilibertarian and
extremely prolibertarian, which might cause some to question its
determinacy.105
Cross also insists that the fact that leading contemporary originalists such as
Steven Calabresi have “challenged the modern libertarian originalists” on textual and
historical grounds “illustrates the great difficulty of any authentic descriptivist
original understanding.”106 I disagree. With respect to the always insightful Professor
Calabresi, as I pointed out in the above discussion of the work of Patrick Charles and
Lee Strang, liberal originalism is grounded in political theory, rather than textualism
or history. With respect to Cross’s larger point about judicial decisionmaking—his
book is primarily an empirical study about how Supreme Court justices have
employed originalism when deciding actual cases—simply because most Supreme
Court justices seem to be result-oriented does not mean that the originalist materials
they claim to be employing are indeterminate. Rather, it means we need better
judges. Bluntly put, the President and the Senate need to appoint justices who are
“thinkers, and more particularly, legal philosophers”107 who can exercise the selfrestraint necessary to interpret the Constitution in light of the political philosophy of
the Declaration of Independence on which it is based. We also need to impeach
judges who either cannot do so or refuse to do so. Although Thomas Jefferson may
have been correct in arguing that in practice impeachment has “not even [been] a
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See CROSS, supra note 14, at ch. 3.
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Id. at 61 (quoting To Secure These Rights).
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Id. at 62.
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Id. at 71.
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Id. at 71-72.
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Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781,
795 (1957).
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scare-crow,”108 that does not mean it should remain so. The theory of the
Constitution requires that Congress exercise the political courage necessary to
perform its constitutional duty of impeaching those justices who seek to “rewrite”
the Constitution rather than “interpret” it.109

108
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1905).
109
Unpublished Opinion of Hugo Black (1966), in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 274-75 (1985). See also THE FEDERALIST,
supra note 36, at No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that impeachment is a “complete
security” against the “deliberate usurpations” of the Court). See generally GERBER, TO SECURE
THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6, at ch. 4.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/5

22

